1	COURT OF APPEALS
2	STATE OF NEW YORK
3	TN THE MARTER OF TIME LECTO
4	IN THE MATTER OF TINA LEGGIO,
5	Appellant,
6	-against- No. 9
7	DEVINE, et al.
8	Respondents.
9	20 Eagle Street Albany, New York
10	January 9, 2020 Before:
11	CHIEF JUDGE JANET DIFIORE
12	ASSOCIATE JUDGE JENNY RIVERA ASSOCIATE JUDGE LESLIE E. STEIN
13	ASSOCIATE JUDGE EUGENE M. FAHEY ASSOCIATE JUDGE MICHAEL J. GARCIA ASSOCIATE JUDGE ROWAN D. WILSON
14	ASSOCIATE JUDGE PAUL FEINMAN
15	Annearanges
16	Appearances:
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25	Official Court Hamscriber



CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Good afternoon, everyone. 1 2 The first appeal on this afternoon's calendar is Matter of 3 Leggio v. Devine. 4 Counsel? 5 MS. ZWEIG: May it please the court. I am Beth 6 Zweig from Nassau/Suffolk Law Services Committee, and I am 7 appearing on behalf of the appellant, Tina Leggio. 8 I would like to reserve two minutes of my time 9 for rebuttal, please. 10 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: You may, of course. 11 MS. ZWEIG: Thank you. 12 This is a case about a struggling family who lost 13 their food stamps or SNAP benefits for one reason and one 14 reason only, two of the children in the household started 15 college. 16 JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, can you look at the 17 regulation, right, 273.9, and it's the support and alimony 18 payments, right? So it seems you agree on - - - on this 19 point, that it depends on where this income - - - this - -20 - this child support is going. Is it income of - - -2.1 unearned income of the mother or is it unearned income of 2.2 the child? 23 And the problem or the issue I have with your 24 interpretation of this regulation, forgetting deference,

for - - - for a second, is it says "support or alimony

payments made directly to the household from nonhousehold members". And if I take out "directly to the household", your argument doesn't change at all. I mean, it seems to me you're reading this part of the reg to say "support or alimony payments made from nonhousehold members", because then I would look, as I do with every other subdivision here, like wages, and say whose is it? Is it the mom's? Is it - - is it the student's? So what does "directly to the household" mean, assuming we apply the rule that it has to mean something?

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MS. ZWEIG: We are not proceeding on the argument of 273.9 which discusses the payments made on behalf of nonhousehold members used exclusively for the care and maintenance of nonhousehold members, rather 273.5(d) specifically states that the income of ineligible college students shall be treated as handled in 273.11(d). So that provision is not governing - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Assuming this wasn't an ineligible student, for a minute, this provision I just read would apply?

MS. ZWEIG: Correct.

JUDGE GARCIA: So it doesn't really matter household, nonhousehold member, what this provision is talking about is who is the income going to. So it seems that argument is just a backdoor way of avoiding this

provision, but this provision seems directly related to child-support payments and how you are going to allocate them. So once you figure out that, and I think your adversary concedes, if it's income of the student, it goes to (d) and it's income of the student.

But first we have to get by, I think, what does "directly to the household" mean because it seems there is a very good argument, to me, that it means directly - - - where is it directly going? It's going directly to the

MS. ZWEIG: The provision talks about - - - if it's directly to the household, the question is whether it's used exclusively - - - according to that provision, whether it's used exclusively for the care and maintenance of nonhousehold members.

MS. ZWEIG: I - - - I believe that's in the direct language of the provision. 273.9 specifically says that monies received and used for the care and maintenance of a third-party beneficiary who's not a household member. However, we aren't proceeding - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: But where do you find that?

JUDGE STEIN: But that's a - - -

JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah, that's a - - -

JUDGE STEIN: That's a different subdivision.

That - - -

mother in this case.

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1	JUDGE GARCIA: Yeah.
2	JUDGE STEIN: That's sort of going, I think, to
3	your alternative argument.
4	JUDGE GARCIA: Right.
5	JUDGE WILSON: Can I ask you about, in the recor
6	there's a child support order, right?
7	MS. ZWEIG: Correct.
8	JUDGE WILSON: And that directs the payment be
9	made to the SCU; is that right?
10	MS. ZWEIG: It
11	JUDGE WILSON: As a factual matter, are the
12	payments being made to the SCU?
13	MS. ZWEIG: That would be the knowledge of the
14	State respondent. My understanding is that the SCU has
15	been involved to some degree. However, I
16	JUDGE WILSON: So you don't know whether
17	MS. ZWEIG: believe in this case we're not
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19	JUDGE WILSON: I'm just asking a factual
20	question.
21	MS. ZWEIG: Yeah, I
22	JUDGE WILSON: Do you know whether the payments
23	are going to the SCU or not?
24	MS. ZWEIG: I can't answer that. I don't know.
25	And that's the key provision in this case, more so than

1	273.5, even, is the Social Services Law 111-h(4), which
2	expressly resolves the dispute as to whether child support
3	is income to the parent or the child because that
4	JUDGE WILSON: That's why I asked the question -
5	
6	MS. ZWEIG: Right.
7	JUDGE WILSON: because that's dependent on
8	whether it's going to the SCU. And you just told me you
9	don't know whether it is.
LO	MS. ZWEIG: That would be information that the
L1	State
L2	JUDGE WILSON: So
L3	MS. ZWEIG: respondent would have.
L4	JUDGE STEIN: But when it goes from SCU, then it
L5	goes from there to someone else, right? And and
L 6	- are you familiar with? So then the the support
L7	order would say it's payable to so and so through the
L8	through the support collection unit, right?
L9	MS. ZWEIG: My I believe the SCU has been
20	involved, to some degree, in this case, but I don't
21	can't answer
22	JUDGE STEIN: But my point is that SCU
23	MS. ZWEIG: Yeah.
24	JUDGE STEIN: then doesn't well, the
25	order probably would say, like, it might be in a it

might be in a support proceeding between two parents, and it would say it would be payable to the other parent through the support collection unit, right? Do - - - is that - - -

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MS. ZWEIG: It may say that in - - - it might say that in the order, if that were the case. I - - - again, my understanding is that the primary method of collection and distribution of the child support funds in this case has been from the custodial - - - noncustodial parent to the custodial parent, but that's just a mechanism of collection. And for the case to hinge on whether the funds go through the support collection unit and then to the custodial parent and then to the child, or directly from the noncustodial parent to the custodial parent, in our view, would be an arbitrary distinction.

JUDGE WILSON: Well, I thought that's why you directed us to  $111-h\left(4\right)$ .

MS. ZWEIG: Correct, because in 111-h(4) it means that in New York the State legislature has already determined that, for purposes of Social Services Law, child support is countable as income to the child instead of to the parent.

JUDGE GARCIA: But let's say that conflicted with this, and the federal regulations said no, that we're going to do it this way, who wins?



MS. ZWEIG: If the federal regulations were 1 2 absolutely clear on who the child support income is 3 countable to, then - - - then the federal regulation would 4 win out and - - -5 JUDGE STEIN: Do you know how it's treated for 6 purposes of taxes or anything of that nature? 7 MS. ZWEIG: For purposes of taxes, it's not 8 countable - - - it's not deductible for the payee spouse. 9 JUDGE STEIN: Right, but would it go - - - do you 10 -- - so all right, so it wouldn't go on anybody's tax 11 returns. 12 MS. ZWEIG: Correct. 13 JUDGE STEIN: Are you familiar with the child 14 support formula? 15 MS. ZWEIG: To some degree. 16 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. Well, it's been awhile since 17

I've practiced family law, but - - - but to my understanding, it's still the case that there is a formula, and that formula directs the noncustodial parent to pay a certain percentage of that parent's income as - - - you know, it's got a lengthy definition of how you define income, but once you get to that income number, you pay a certain percentage. And for one child, that percentage is or was seventeen percent. For two children, it was twenty-five percent. For three children it was twenty-nine

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percent, and so on and so forth.

So it - - - that - - - for purposes of that formula, it's not a direct pro rata allocation that you can divide a child support payment, if there are four children, four equal ways. Does - - - does that make sense? So - - so how does that affect your argument that it should be pro rata

MS. ZWEIG: Yeah.

JUDGE STEIN: - - - divided?

MS. ZWEIG: So I understand that - - - that it's a, sort of, complicated, to some degree, formula. But at no point in the course of this litigation has the State respondent argued that the two-fifth's deduction is inappropriate. And the Appellate Division did find that it was appropriate to pro rate the funds out by using a two-fifths formula.

 $\,$  JUDGE FEINMAN: I see that the red light's on, but if I may.

CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes, you may.

JUDGE FEINMAN: There - - - putting aside whether it's the child or the parent, what about the issue of deference to OTDA's position? Why shouldn't we give deference to that position?

MS. ZWEIG: The reason why deference is not appropriate in this case is if - - there are a few



different arguments. First of all, 111-h(4)'s Social

Services Law gives an answer in this question. It says the

New York State legislature has made a determination that

child support is to be deemed, for all purposes, to be the

property of the person for whom such money is paid; that

would be the child. In addition, the OTDA hasn't had a

policy - - -

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JUDGE STEIN: My understanding of that, by the way, is that it was the import - - - that the sig - - - the reason for that determination was that it was as between the payor and the payee parent, not as between the parents and/or the child.

MS. ZWEIG: The word - - -

JUDGE STEIN: Could that be the case?

MS. ZWEIG: I - - - you know, the plain language of it, "the property for whom such money is paid", that would be the child's property, because that's the property of the person for whom such money is paid to - - - so that's the plain meaning of the word - - - that phrasing, "to whom such money is paid".

And beyond that, the State has not had a policy on this - - on this issue. It seems to be a bit of an after-the-fact rationalization. There is a case from 2013, a fair hearing decision, where the agency found that child support income is - - in a similar circumstance to this,



1	is excluded from from being countable as income to
2	the food stamp household.
3	So there hasn't been a consistent policy of the
4	agency. In addition, there's no administrative directive
5	or informational letter or any other policy on this
6	subject. So deference is not appropriate when there is an
7	answer in Social Services Law and there's no pre-existing
8	policy.
9	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
10	MS. ZWEIG: Thank you.
11	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel?
12	MR. AMEND: Thank you very much. Andrew Amend
13	for the commissioner.
14	JUDGE STEIN: Counsel, are you familiar with the
15	decision to which your adversary just referred?
16	MR. AMEND: The November 2013 Decision After Fair
17	Hearing?
18	JUDGE STEIN: Yes, is that inconsistent with your
19	position here?
20	MR. AMEND: It is, to a limited extent. We
21	conceded below that that decision was incorrect. And by
22	the way
23	JUDGE RIVERA: Is that the only decision that's
24	contrary to the current position?
25	MR. AMEND: That is the only one, with the



1	debatable exception of two decisions cited in my friend's
2	reply brief that we responded to in our response to the
3	amicus brief. Both of those decisions post-date the 2018
4	decision by the Second Department and apply the income
5	attribution rule proscribed by the Second Department.
6	JUDGE STEIN: But the 2013 decision, wasn't the
7	the ineligible student there also the parent?
8	MR. AMEND: There was a different 2013
9	JUDGE STEIN: Oh, okay.
10	MR. AMEND: decision.
11	JUDGE STEIN: I'm sorry then then I'm
12	confused.
13	MR. AMEND: which was also cited in
14	JUDGE STEIN: Okay.
15	MR. AMEND: their reply and and in
16	our response to the amicus brief.
17	JUDGE WILSON: So could I ask you to address my
18	two questions
19	MR. AMEND: Yes.
20	JUDGE WILSON: about 111-h. First
21	MR. AMEND: Sure.
22	JUDGE WILSON: the factual question of
23	where these monies are paid. Are they paid in the support
24	housing support collection unit or not, and second,
25	what your understanding of 111-h is.

1	MR. AMEND: So our understanding is that the
2	money is paid by check to the parent. That is what she
3	alleged. She's never claimed that
4	JUDGE WILSON: The order, you realize, says
5	something different.
6	MR. AMEND: I do realize that.
7	JUDGE WILSON: Okay.
8	MR. AMEND: But sometimes arrangements on the
9	ground, parents can agree. In any event, 111-h does not
10	apply here, and even if it did
11	JUDGE WILSON: Because?
12	MR. AMEND: Well, because there's no
13	there's no allegation that she has ever made. She's never
14	disputed that she gets the check directly. She's never
15	asserted the involvement of the collection unit. And in
16	any event
17	JUDGE RIVERA: Directly from the person
18	responsible for paying the support; is that what you mean?
19	MR. AMEND: Correct. She's never she said
20	I get a check
21	JUDGE RIVERA: There's no intermediary.
22	MR. AMEND: a check from my husband.
23	JUDGE RIVERA: is cutting that check or
24	passing the check onto her.
25	MR. AMEND: Correct.

1	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay.
2	MR. AMEND: But she has said I get a check from
3	my husband.
4	JUDGE FAHEY: So is it correct that both sides
5	agree that the pro rata approach is a correct approach?
6	MR. AMEND: We agreed that it would be the
7	correct approach if this were money under Section 7 C.F.R
8	273.9(d)(6). That applies for payments that are in fact
9	used for the care and maintenance of a third-party
10	beneficiary who is not a household member. That
11	JUDGE FAHEY: But this isn't a third-party
12	beneficiary, so
13	MR. AMEND: It's also not someone who is not a
14	household member.
15	JUDGE FAHEY: You know what I wonder is,
16	underlying this all is an accepted we defer because
17	it's rational.
18	MR. AMEND: Correct.
19	JUDGE FAHEY: Right? So in in our
20	deferring because it's rational, the pro rata approach to
21	the calculation of household income which, if I have it
22	correctly, exempts that it counts the household
23	income that the college students receive, but then it's
24	deducted for food stamp purposes, right?

MR. AMEND: If they actually received income;

say they were working ten hours a week instead of twenty.

JUDGE FAHEY: There's a special provision for college students.

MR. AMEND: Yes, their wages - - - right.

JUDGE FAHEY: So what it says to me, though, so for the calculation it says that we take these - - - the - - - the pro rata section of their child support income, that the college students would receive, out. And of course that seems totally irrational to me. I know of no household in America that actually operates that way where the money comes in and then it's divided by four or five, whatever the number is, and then you - - you say, okay, this is for this child, and this is for this child, and this amount is for this child.

That's not how rationally - - - how things actually operate. And it - - - it seems to - - - to argue that a child support percentage assigned to each child is - - - is, on its face, irrational, and particularly in light of the effect of it all, because the effect of this, of course, is that in - - - in 2018, I believe, sixty-nine - - - according to the Bureau of Statistics, sixty-nine percent of high school students went on to college. Of those sixty-nine percent that went onto college, seventy-one percent of them come from nontraditional households, households with one parent say, in that form. Those are



the bulk of people that are on food stamps.

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So what we're saying is everybody who's on food stamps is - - is a family that genuinely needs it. It makes some sense. And we've devised what seems to be a formula that, I don't really fault the agency, but it appears, through the regulations that are totally irrational, and I'm wondering, in this calculation that ends up with this, in my mind, unfair and absurd result, is there anything that the State of New York could do about it, or are we stuck with this calculation?

MR. AMEND: The State of New York is stuck with this calculation only insofar as there is a child support payment that is in fact directed to someone who is not living in the household.

JUDGE FAHEY: I see.

MR. AMEND: That's the only purpose - - -

JUDGE STEIN: So then to you, does it make a difference - - I just want to understand your position - - if the noncustodial parent makes the payment directly to the child, you say that's easy; that's the child's income, right?

MR. AMEND: Correct.

JUDGE STEIN: What if the noncustodial parent makes the payment to the custodial parent, and then the custodial parent gives the child some pro rata share of



that money every week or every month and says, this is yours and you take care of your needs. What's - - - JUDGE FEINMAN: Or a further hypothetical, puts

MR. AMEND: The dispositive fact in all of those scenarios is: Is the child living at home? If the child is living at home, then the exception for money used for the care of third parties who are not in the home doesn't apply.

it in a bank account that is only controlled by the child.

What - - - what does apply and what matters is
,for the reasons Judge Fahey intimated, this child support,
whether it comes through the SCU or directly from the
petitioner's ex-husband, is money in her pocket that is
available to her to use for food and other expenses for the
household.

JUDGE STEIN: If she - - -

hypotheticals are asking if - - - if what you all have done is adopt a presumption, and the presumption has proved, at least in a particular case, to have been rebutted, which I think there's an argument which may have done that, but would the presumption still hold? Does the court have to say the presumption still holds in the face of contrary evidence in an individual case?

MR. AMEND: I'm not sure I understand where the



presumption has been rebutted?

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, the presumption, as I understood it, that you represented, was that the money goes to the parent who's controlling it, and therefore they can use it for the benefit of the household, and so it's household income. If I've misunderstood what you represented, please clarify.

MR. AMEND: That's correct.

JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. So then if, again, the parent puts forth evidence that there's a factual finding that is credible, and rebuts that underlying presumption, are we bound to recognize the presumption? That's what I'm saying to you.

MR. AMEND: Well, first - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: I'm asking.

MR. AMEND: - - - they - - - the presumption would still apply in this case because there's been no evidence of a transfer of funds directly to the children.

Second - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, I know the hypotheticals wanted to present a case where the parent has released all control, but it's clear in this case that her position has been I only use it for this child; I know you presume otherwise, but I only use it for this child. And I can't find anything but a fact-finding that agrees that that is



what - - - that has accepted that representation. 1 2 MR. AMEND: What matters in this case is that 3 these are children in her home, and she retains discretion, 4 absolute discretion - - -5 JUDGE STEIN: And isn't the purpose of the rule -6 7 MR. AMEND: - - - as a matter of law to use it for the household. 8 9 JUDGE STEIN: - - - that the State doesn't want to have to go into the household and - - - and try to 10 enforce and figure out, okay, what's really going on here, 11 12 is the - - is the mother - - she has the discretion, 13 and she may exercise that discretion to give the money to 14 the child, or she may not, or maybe one month she does and 15 another month she doesn't. And - - - and the State is 16 looking for a hard and fast rule that says, unless that 17 money goes directly from the other parent to the child, 18 this parent is - - - still has discretion for what that 19 parent wants to do with it. 20 MR. AMEND: Yes. 21 JUDGE STEIN: Isn't that - - -22 MR. AMEND: Yes. 23 JUDGE STEIN: Okay. 24 MR. AMEND: That is the essence of our position. 25 JUDGE STEIN: That's the point of the rule.

_	MR. AMEND: Yes.
2	JUDGE WILSON: And I think you answered this
3	before; I just want to make sure I understood
4	MR. AMEND: Um-hum.
5	JUDGE WILSON: the answer correctly.
6	Assume all of these children are living in the home, but
7	the noncustodial parent here, the father, decides to write
8	five separate checks, he does the pro rata himself, and
9	sends them directly to each child. What happens, in your
LO	view, to the SNAP benefits?
11	MR. AMEND: If the the money that is
L2	received directly by the ineligible student children and
L3	bypassing the custodial parent altogether
L4	JUDGE WILSON: Right, it goes straight to the
L5	child. They're living in the household, though.
16	MR. AMEND: That right, but that would be
L7	excluded under
L8	JUDGE WILSON: And so the household would be
L9	SNAP-eligible, under that circumstance?
20	MR. AMEND: Yes, and I'd like to just respond to
21	the idea that there is any unfairness or irrationality in
22	the result that this household, unfortunately, was unable
23	to qualify for SNAP. There is nothing unfair, irrational,
24	or unreasonable about a regulatory interpretation that



reflects the reality on the ground that mom is the one

receiving this money and retaining discretion over how to use it, and applying that rationale in a way that provides an inducement for all of the members of the household to become eligible for SNAP. An overall programmatic goal that's very important here is - - -

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DUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, your light is off, so before you have to sit down - - - because I think you've got the meat of your point out there - - - I'm not so clear why we have to decide whether or not the mother is the recipient of the child support or the child is a recipient of the child support. Given, I - - - I read the federal statute and the regs to mean child support counts. If you're a member of the household, even if you're ineligible, child support counts. Tell me what interrelationship of these provisions requires us to actually figure out this other question?

MR. AMEND: The other question comes into play only if there is a child who is living outside of the household, who is not a household member, because there's a specific income exclusion in the SNAP act and the state and federal regulations.

JUDGE RIVERA: Which is not this case.

MR. AMEND: Which is not this case. And in an effort to be generous as much as possible to parents, custodial parents receiving child support, OTDA has



recognized that if a parent actually transfers the money to 1 2 a student who is outside the home, then that deduction 3 should apply. 4 JUDGE RIVERA: But that's not this case, so again 5 6 MR. AMEND: That is not this case. 7 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - why do we have to resolve 8 this question of whether it's the child's support or the 9 custodial parent or the person who's responsible for 10 receiving it and has control over it? 11 MR. AMEND: Oh, sorry. The reason that it would 12 matter in this case is that if the child support is truly 13 deemed to be income of the - - - the supported child, and 14 even if 111-h would make it otherwise the child's property, 15 there's no dispute that the parent is the one to whom it's 16 payable. The support order referenced by Judge Wilson says 17 that. 18 That money, if it is their income, if they went

That money, if it is their income, if they went out and got a job and worked ten hours a week, they got their paycheck, they were controlling how they used their paycheck, then the federal regulations say that, for an ineligible student, that money would be excluded.

JUDGE RIVERA: But I understood the regs to mean that a student like the children in this case - - -  $\,$ 

MR. AMEND: Um-hum.



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1	JUDGE RIVERA: right? If they're not
2	participating in in a work program, as explained and
3	defined in the federal statute and the regs, you count
4	child support in that household. It doesn't matter whether
5	it's the person who is receiving it, the adult or the
6	child. Am I misreading something?
7	MR. AMEND: The misreading would be if there is a
8	child support check and this is exceedingly rare.
9	This I mean, these are already kind of unicorn cases,
10	but you know, this would be a unicorn with sparkles or
11	something.
12	JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. Two unicorns.
13	MR. AMEND: In that rare case, the child support
14	would be treated as income to the child because the parent
15	never exercises who's the head of the household never
16	exercises control over it.
17	JUDGE GARCIA: Counsel, before you sit down, with
18	the chief Judge's permission
19	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Yes.
20	JUDGE GARCIA: I'd just like to go back to
21	deference for a minute.
22	MR. AMEND: Sure.
23	JUDGE GARCIA: You know, I agree with Judge
24	Rivera; I believe there is a way to read these clearly.
25	But if we were going on on deference, we've already

1	discussed that the agency, arguably, has one or or
2	more potentially inconsistent interpretations. It seems t
3	me, in the examples you cite of other states, the position
4	of the state agency isn't codified in a manual, at least,
5	right? And you do not seem to have that.
6	MR. AMEND: We have not reduced that position to
7	a an administrative directive
8	JUDGE GARCIA: Right.
9	MR. AMEND: at this time. We could
10	JUDGE GARCIA: And you also didn't write these
11	regs, right? The
12	MR. AMEND: We well
13	JUDGE GARCIA: federal government wrote
14	them.
15	MR. AMEND: We the fact that this is
16	derived and largely controlled by federal regs doesn't, in
17	itself, defeat agency deference to
18	JUDGE GARCIA: It doesn't defeat it, but we've
19	said
20	MR. AMEND: And if you sorry.
21	JUDGE GARCIA: one of the reasons to defer
22	to a state agency is that they wrote the regs.
23	And lastly, we have a case, this court, Rodrigue
24	v. Perales, where there's kind of a tie with the federal -
25	similar not this program, a different program,

but joint, federal government saying one thing, agency saying one thing, state saying another. We say, look, the feds wrote these regs; we're going with a deference to the federal agency. That, at least by trial courts, has been interpreted to mean no deference to the state agency in interpreting a regulatory scheme controlled and written by the federal government.

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So if you combine all of those factors here, an inconsistent position, lack of a formal statement, you didn't write the regulations, and you're a state agency interpreting federal program and regulations, what level of deference should we give to the agency here?

MR. AMEND: There are a number of issues here with assuming that OTDA should not get deference. There is the fact that while this is a federal regulatory scheme that's implemented by the states, the states are given discretion, including - - and this is by the federal government - - over the particular area of how to allocate child support as income.

JUDGE GARCIA: Where is that? Where is that delegation found of discretion?

MR. AMEND: It's discussed in - - - in our brief.

JUDGE GARCIA: But it's a federal reg? How is it delegated to the state agency to interpret what's child



_	support, now it's allocated?
2	MR. AMEND: There's a general delegation by
3	congress and then by FNS, to the states to implement
4	to adopt and implement reasonable interpretations, as
5	necessary, to carry out the
6	JUDGE RIVERA: That don't otherwise conflict wit
7	the statute and the federal regs, correct?
8	MR. AMEND: Correct, Your Honor. So
9	JUDGE RIVERA: May I ask: Did you include it in
LO	the State plan, this interpretation?
L1	MR. AMEND: We have
L2	JUDGE RIVERA: The state plan you have to submit
L3	to the feds for approval?
L4	MR. AMEND: The state has otherwise has
L5	otherwise made FNS aware of its position. FNS has not
L6	- they haven't said we're wrong. They haven't said we're
L7	auditing you. They haven't said give us the money back.
L8	JUDGE RIVERA: How did you make them aware? Wha
L9	does that mean?
20	MR. AMEND: In this case, it was an email
21	communication with representatives at FNS.
22	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
23	MR. AMEND: Sorry, there's just one more
24	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Of course.
25	MR. AMEND: point I could respond to

1	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Please.
2	MR. AMEND: Judge Gar
3	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Garcia.
4	MR. AMEND: Yeah, thank you Judge Garcia's
5	question.
6	JUDGE GARCIA: Still having trouble with my name.
7	MR. AMEND: We have not written this down in an
8	administrative directive. We could, and we might after
9	this case. But there is there has been one
10	inconsistent Decision After Fair Hearing out of thousands
11	and thousands of such decisions that get issued every year.
12	And nine
13	JUDGE WILSON: Wait, I thought these were unicorn
14	cases.
15	MR. AMEND: They are, but if you
16	JUDGE WILSON: I mean, my daughter does have a
17	thousand sparkly unicorns, but
18	MR. AMEND: Right.
19	JUDGE WILSON: I didn't assume you did.
20	MR. AMEND: Well, that point is actually relevant
21	to the last thing that I just wanted to say, which is that
22	they have identified one case that goes the other way, and
23	we have identified ten, the amended Decision After Fair
24	Hearing here and nine other decisions cited in our brief
25	that consistently apply the rationale we have articulated

that consistently apply the rationale we have articulated

1 in this case. And in any event, that is a reasonable 2 interpretation of the regulations which is worthy of at 3 least some modicum of deference by the courts. 4 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, sir. 5 MR. AMEND: Thank you very much. 6 CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Counsel? MS. ZWEIG: Just to bring up a few issues that 7 8 were brought up. So the issue here is that the child 9 support, and this was - - - this was brought up, to some 10 degree, the State acknowledged that the pro rata share at 11 the two-fifths was used exclusively for the care and 12 maintenance of the college students. And counting the 13 child support against the four remaining household members, 14 that is, the mother, Tina Leggio, and the sixteen, twelve, 15 and nine-year-old children, that's a problem because, in 16 essence, the household ends up being doubly punished. 17 JUDGE RIVERA: Counsel, let me just - - -18 JUDGE STEIN: But all they have to do is - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: I'm sorry. 20 JUDGE STEIN: - - - is comply with the 2.1 eligibility requirements for students; isn't - - - isn't 2.2 that true? And then - - - then that changes the whole 23 thing. 24 MS. ZWEIG: It is true that they would no longer

be ineligible students, and it is true that 273.5(d),

combined with 273.11, makes it absolutely clear that the 1 2 income of the ineligible college student, that is, the 3 college student who is invisible to the SNAP household, that income is excluded from the SNAP household income. 4 5 JUDGE RIVERA: Okay. 6 MS. ZWEIG: It is true that - - -7 JUDGE RIVERA: So let me just - - -8 MS. ZWEIG: Yeah. 9 JUDGE RIVERA: - - - understand. So you agree 10 that if child support is going to - - - let's just use this phrase for right now, the custodial adult - - - adult who's 11 12 responsible to get, right, by court order, the - - - that 13 that would count, right? That - - - that's an individual 14 in the household. That would count towards the household 15 income, correct? 16 MS. ZWEIG: Not if it's used exclusively for the 17 care and maintenance of the ineligible college student. 18 But - - - but even - - -19 JUDGE RIVERA: No, no, no. 20 MS. ZWEIG: I'm sorry. 21 JUDGE RIVERA: I don't think you understand. 22 MS. ZWEIG: I'm sorry. 23 JUDGE RIVERA: The child support is going to this 24 individual, right, and they use it for the household. Let

me try it that way. You - - - you agree it counts?

1	MS. ZWEIG: They
2	JUDGE RIVERA: And let me try it this way.
3	MS. ZWEIG: Yeah.
4	JUDGE RIVERA: And if the child support is going
5	to the college student, the at least minimum part-time
6	college student, who then is not complying with the work
7	requirements set out in the federal statute and regs, that
8	that would also count if they're part of the household. Do
9	you agree with that statement?
10	MS. ZWEIG: No.
11	JUDGE RIVERA: Why not?
12	MS. ZWEIG: Unless I I might have
13	misunderstood what you said.
14	JUDGE RIVERA: No, I'm sure I'm getting it wrong,
15	but that's why I'm asking.
16	MS. ZWEIG: The income of the ineligible college
17	student, as long as it's countable to the ineligible
18	college student, is not countable, is excluded
19	JUDGE RIVERA: And ineligible student is a member
20	of the household, not not that they're a nonmember, a
21	member of the household who doesn't comply with the work
22	requirements that that such college student would be
23	subject to. Doesn't that child support count towards the
24	household?

MS. ZWEIG: No, college students are not subject

to work requirements. There are specific eligibility guidelines laid out in 273.5.

2.1

2.2

JUDGE RIVERA: Well, they cannot be eligible if they don't satisfy work requirements unless they're otherwise excluded.

MS. ZWEIG: They - - - there are a number of ways that students can become eligible for food stamps, but if they're ineligible, it's as if they're treated as though they're invisible to the household. That's the way I look at it. So it - - - it's as if they don't exist in the household.

So that would mean, in our estimation, that not only - - - so the household size actually decreases. In this case the household size decreased from six members of the household to four members of the household as a result of - - and what that actually meant is the income eligibility levels and the maximum possible benefit level decreased accordingly.

But then the income that was used exclusively for the care and maintenance of those children then counted against the four remaining household members. So what it did is it, in essence, doubly punished the kids for going to college.

JUDGE RIVERA: Could the adult who receives the child support use it for everyone but the child?



MS. ZWEIG: If - - -

JUDGE RIVERA: Would that be permissible?

MS. ZWEIG: If the - - - if it was used for everyone but the child - - - I - - - I actually do believe it would be permissible because of the Social Services Law

JUDGE FAHEY: Let me - - -

MS. ZWEIG: - - - 111-h(4).

JUDGE FAHEY: Can I - - -

JUDGE STEIN: But money's fungible, so this child support is coming in, and I think this is part of it too.

And - - - and let's just say, for the moment, that - - - that mom and maybe, who knows, some other family member,

has - - - has their own earned income or other income, it all goes together and it all goes to pay for stuff, right?

So how do you say whether that child support income is going directly to the child or not going directly to the child or is being used for everybody else and not the child? How - - - how can you even make that determination?

MS. ZWEIG: Well, in this case, it was a state respondent who made the determination that the funds were being used exclusively for the care and maintenance of the ineligible students. And it was brought up over the course of the hearing, but the State's amended decision made it absolutely clear that the - - - that the pro rata share of



1	the child support income was in fact used exclusively for
2	the care and maintenance of the ineligible students. And
3	by counting it against the four remaining household
4	members, that child support income, what that means is that
5	these students really should not be using the money for
6	their own benefit, for their own food needs, if they aren't
7	eligible for food stamp benefits, for SNAP benefits, and so
8	the parents and the three children can use it on
9	themselves.
10	JUDGE RIVERA: Isn't that about a policy choice,
11	though, that we are not able to ignore?
12	MS. ZWEIG: Well, it's that that
13	could be a policy choice, but we're saying that it
14	shouldn't be.
15	JUDGE FAHEY: Can I ask you this? Is there a way
16	that the college students in this case could have been
17	eligible for food stamps and in having and raise the
18	divisor from four to six in this case?
19	MS. ZWEIG: There is
20	JUDGE FAHEY: How would that have been done?
21	MS. ZWEIG: There is a mechanism.
22	JUDGE FAHEY: Tell me; how would it be done?
23	MS. ZWEIG: If they had participated in a work-
24	study program
25	JUDGE FAHEY: So a work-study program Something

1	that amounted to twenty hours a week; is that right?
2	MS. ZWEIG: Twenty hours a week is another
3	provision. Some of these provisions are easier said than
4	done in terms of
5	JUDGE FAHEY: I understand that, yeah.
6	MS. ZWEIG: But there are ways that are laid out
7	in 273.5, for students to become household members.
8	CHIEF JUDGE DIFIORE: Thank you, counsel.
9	JUDGE FAHEY: Thank you.
10	MS. ZWEIG: Thank you.
11	(Court is adjourned)
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CERTIFICATION I, Sharona Shapiro, certify that the foregoing transcript of proceedings in the court of Appeals of Matter of Tina Leggio v. Devine, et al., No. 9, was prepared using the required transcription equipment and is a true and accurate record of the proceedings. Shanna Shaphe Signature: Agency Name: eScribers Address of Agency: 352 Seventh Avenue Suite 604 New York, NY 10001 Date: January 15, 2020 

